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WHY OHIO SHOULD RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT TO A JURY 
TRIAL IN INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS 
Katherine McDonald* 
“Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect 
liberty when the government’s purposes are beneficent.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Each year in the U.S., “well over one million persons are civilly 
committed to hospitals for psychiatric treatment,” and a third are 
involuntary commitments.2 Involuntary commitment involves the 
detention and, generally, the treatment of individuals with a mental 
illness.3 This commitment is a deprivation of an individual’s liberty, and 
it can extend for an indefinite period of time.4 In addition, an individual 
adjudicated mentally ill will experience serious collateral consequences 
that may include stigma and forced treatment.5 Although mental illness 
does not differentiate in regards to economic status, race, or level of 
education, involuntarily commitment tends to focus on individuals who 
were considered “social outcast[s] even prior to their hospitalization” and 
thirty-seven percent of commitments are for nonwhites.6 Further, “[t]he 
vast majority of involuntary committees are hospitalized because of 
annoying or bizarre behavior rather than for threatening or violent acts.”7 
Currently, civil commitment is a legal process.8 This article argues that 
since it is a legal process with serious repercussions, reflective legal 
protections must be afforded to individuals involved in the proceedings. 
 
* Associate Member, 2016-2017 University of Cincinnati Law Review. 
 1. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1103 (ED Wis. 1972) (quoting Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).  
 2. Mary L. Durham, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Research, Policy and Practice, in 
MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: RESEARCH, POLICY AND SERVICES 17, 17 (Bruce D. Sales & Saleem A. Shah 
eds., 1996). Additionally, the author writes that an issue exists about whether the two-thirds of voluntary 
commitments are really voluntary or if some of them are the product of being given the choice of either 
voluntarily committing or being committed against their will. Id. at n.1.  
 3. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1997). But see Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 
(1997); Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002).  
 4. Developments in the Law, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1193-
94 (1974) [hereinafter Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill]. 
 5. Id. at 1200-1201; Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979); Sell v. U.S., 539 U.S. 166 
(2003). 
 6. Durham, supra note 2, at 18-19. Further the article notes that “[n]inety percent or more of state 
mental hospital patients are unemployed when committed. Most do not have a high school education and 
lack skills or experience for well-paying jobs.”  
 7. Id. at 19. 
 8. Id. at 21; SAMUEL JAN BRACKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW, 21 (1985). 
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Particularly, it argues that Ohio should statutorily adopt the right to a jury 
trial for involuntary commitment proceedings.9 
Part II of this article provides background information on juries and 
involuntary commitment. First, it describes why jury trials are important. 
Second, it provides a brief history on the treatment of individuals with a 
mental illness. Part III focuses on Supreme Court decisions reforming 
substantive and procedural protections for civil commitment. In addition, 
it will describe involuntary commitment in Ohio. Part IV analyzes the 
repercussions of involuntary commitment. Finally, Part V argues that 
because of the important role the jury serves and the serious nature of 
involuntary civil commitment, individuals should have a jury trial option.  
II.  WHY HAVE A JURY: HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF INDIVIDUALS WITH A 
MENTAL DISORDER 
A.  Why Juries Are Important 
The Constitution and its protections are “an important bulwark against 
tyranny and corruption.”10 Understanding the importance of jury trials, 
the founders codified the right in both the Sixth and Seventh 
Amendments.11 Further, jury trials in civil proceedings are an imperative 
protection, and the Supreme Court has stated: 
 
[w]ith, perhaps, some exceptions, trial by jury has always been, and 
still is, generally regarded as the normal and preferable mode of 
disposing of issues of fact in civil cases at law as well as in criminal 
cases. Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such 
importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and 
jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial 
 
 9. This article focuses on involuntary commitment proceedings that are neither the result of an 
insanity defense nor sexual predator statues. Both the insanity and sexual predator commitment are 
pertinent at to some issues, but they include other issues that distinguish them from other involuntary 
commitment proceedings. For example, the insanity defense is an affirmative defense chosen by a 
defendant and asserted at trial. If the individual is found not guilty by reason of insanity, then individual 
States determine the proceedings for commencing civil commitment. See Jones v. U.S., 463 U.S. 354 
(1983) for a discussion on the differences. Likewise, sexual predator statutes may be the result of a trial 
(or criminal proceeding) that then leads to civil commitment; see Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 for further 
discussion. 
 10. See e.g. Parklane Hosiery Co. Inc. v Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (The full quote is as follows “[t]he founders of our Nation considered the right of trial by jury 
in civil cases an important bulwark against tyranny and corruption, a safeguard too precious to be left to 
the whim of the sovereign, or, it might be added, to that of the judiciary.”); TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. 
Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 473 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Butler v. Jordan, 
750 N.E.2d 554, 570 (Ohio 2001); Gladon v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 662 N.E.2d 287, 
302 (Ohio 1996).  
 11. U.S. Const. amend. VI & VII. 
2
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss3/6
2018] RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL FOR INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT 1049 
should be scrutinized with the utmost care.12   
 
 Below are a few of the reasons why juries are important. This article 
recognizes that a jury trial also raises practical concerns, such as the cost 
and delay associated with juries.13 Additionally, some scholars argue that 
juries are unfair and inefficient because they are untrained and unskilled 
(in law) citizens working through complex issues.14 Nevertheless, as this 
article illustrates, a balancing of those reasons against the individual and 
public interest supports affording the right of jury trials.  
1.  A Safeguard for American Ideals & a Reflection of the Community  
 A jury trial embodies democratic ideals, encourages the participation 
of society, and introduces community values into the decision-making 
process.15 The jury serves and preserves the “fundamental American 
perceptions about the nature of justice and its interaction with various 
social processes.”16 In addition, the jury is a better reflection of the 
community.17 Although juries have prejudices and biases, voir dire 
provides an opportunity to discover these prejudices, whereas such an 
opportunity is not possible to determine judicial prejudices.18 
2.  A Group Setting to Weigh the Evidence and Facts Appropriately 
Another important aspect of a jury is its makeup. First, the group 
setting may influence the jury to deliberate longer than a judge; thus, the 
discussion “may raise issues not otherwise considered by judicial fact 
finders.”19 Second, jurors may weigh the standard more heavily in a case 
than a judge would.20 Finally, jurors, as a decision-making body, have an 
 
 12. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 485–86 (1935).  
 13. 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
2301 (3d ed.). 
 14. Id.  
 15. Id.; Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, supra note 4, at 1292-94; John Kip Cornwell, 
Confining Mentally Disordered “Super Criminals”: A Realignment of Rights in the Nineties, 33 HOUS. 
L. REV. 651, 703 (1996); Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructuring the Legal 
Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1123 (1991); Lisa Kavanaugh, 
Massachusetts’s Sexually Dangerous Persons Legislation: Can Juries Make A Bad Law Better, 35 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 509, 545 (2000). 
 16. WRIGHT, supra note 13, at § 2301. 
 17. Ainsworth, supra note 15, at 1125. 
 18. Kavanaugh, supra note 15, at 552–53. For more information on what voir dire is and its 
purposes see 2 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
380 (4th ed.); 9B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 2482 (3d ed.). 
 19. Kavanaugh, supra note 15, at 552; Ainsworth, supra note 15, at 1124-25.  
 20. Kavanaugh, supra note 15, at 550; Ainsworth, supra note 15, at 1124. 
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amount of anonymity that judges do not have. 21 Therefore, jurors can 
make uncomfortable or tough choices without the external pressures that 
judges have.22 
3.  Justice in Juries 
For several reasons, juries may ensure that an individual has a fair and 
just proceeding. First, juries may ensure a more formalized process.23 
Second, since a jury normally hears one case, the members are less likely 
to become jaded and make standardized or preconceived judgments of 
individuals based on past experience with other patients.24 In other words, 
based on a judge’s experience, she may use abstract categorization of 
individuals to make decisions rather than an individualized decision. 25 In 
contrast, the jury would not have the same experience to base their 
decisions.26 Also, the judge may have knowledge of the individual from 
prior interactions within the court system or the issue at hand,27 whereas, 
juries generally are not privy to any background knowledge on the 
individual that cause prejudgments.28 Third, jurors represent an 
independent decision-making body with an amount of discretion.29 
Therefore, juries are not constrained to unfairness in a law and can 
precipitate “social judgments to what is fair and equitable.”30 Fourth, jury 
trials prevent oppressive or arbitrary decisions imposed on individuals.31 
Finally, a jury may provide protections against serious threats against civil 
liberties of “unpopular and vulnerable population.”32  
B.  Historic Handling of Individuals with a Mental Illness 
The history of commitment of individuals is important for several 
reasons.33 First, although this article does not explore what is the 
 
 21. Kavanaugh, supra note 15, at 552.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, supra note 4, at 1293. 
 24. Ainsworth, supra note 15, at 1124-25. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. WRIGHT, supra note 13 § 2301. 
 30. Id.  
 31. Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, supra note 4, at 1292-93. 
 32. Kavanaugh, supra note 15, at 567 (This article focusses on juries for sexually dangerous 
persons under a Massachusetts statute. Further, it notes that whether juries are protecting the civil liberties 
of individuals is unclear, but the data appears to illustrate that they are.). 
 33. Since the Seventh Amendment relies on historical understanding and common law, this history 
focuses on treatment of the mentally ill in Western Countries. 
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necessary for treatment of individuals with a mental illness, it is important 
to illustrate the consequences of commitment. This is important to fully 
appreciate the gravity of commitment to enable a better decision about 
what type of substantive and procedural protections should be in place. 
Second, as a society, handling of individuals with a mental illness reflects 
a perceived understanding of the illness and then applies the necessary 
corresponding medicinal, physical, situational (where/if they are housed 
and the conditions), and legal treatment.34 However, our understanding of 
mental illness and reflective treatment is not always as sound as the 
current the society believes; therefore, the following section challenges 
the automatic conclusion that commitment is what is best for individuals 
and the overreliance on or deference to experts in the decision-making of 
commitment. 
1.  Ancient Times to the Medieval Ages: “before medicine, there was 
magic”35 
As the following explains, during ancient times and the medieval 
period, a mental illness was the result of a demonic possession.36 In the 
ancient period, evil spirits or deities punished the individual through 
disease.37 Thus, the treatment involved magic and exorcisms.38 At times 
treatment involved inhumane and bizarre methods such as physical 
torture.39 Specialized individuals—wizards, sorcerers, priests, medicine 
men and the like—were the forerunners of the modern doctor, and used 
magic to heal.40 
Other highly developed ancient societies like Egypt and Greece also 
connected mental illness with the supernatural and incorporated in their 
treatment healing shrines and ceremonies.41 Both societies showed 
advancement in treatment beyond the mystical. 42 For example, in Greece 
 
 34. Bruce G. Link et al., Public Conceptions of Mental Illness: Labels, Causes, Dangerousness, 
and Social Distance, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1328; BRACKEL, supra note 8, at 34.  
 35. ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THEIR CARE AND 
TREATMENT FROM COLONIAL TIMES, 1 (2007). 
 36. BRACKEL, supra note 8, at 9. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. (For example, one treatment removed parts of the individual’s skull; the reasoning was to 
let out or drive out the evil spirit.). 
 40. DEUTSCH, supra note 35, at 2.  
 41. Id. at 4-8 (For example, in Greece individuals with a mentally illness were taken to a shrine 
for treatment, and then to the temple for “temple sleep.” During temple sleep—the attendant of the temple 
dressed as a god—appeared and determined where the illness that plagued the individuals was located. 
Those who were not cured by the process were cast out of the temple as unworthy of cure. This gave the 
priest-physician an out when the curative ritual and incantation did not work on everyone.). 
 42. Id. Nevertheless, early Greece also equated mental disorders with demonic or divine visions. 
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in the fourth century B.C., Hippocrates and his followers made strides to 
dispel the supernatural as the cause of mental disorders and instead as the 
result of  natural phenomena.43 Nevertheless, Hippocrates explained 
mental illness through his four humors, and used blood-letting and 
purging as treatments.44 Furthermore, when humane and advanced 
treatments were available, often only a small, affluent audience received 
them.45 The more common treatments included those by Celsus, who 
“advocated chains, flogging, semi-starvation diet and the application of 
terror and torture as excellent therapeutic agents.”46 Further, individuals 
with a mental disorder belonging to poorer classes of Rome and Greece 
“were frequently put to death as undesirable or intolerable burdens.”47 
The Roman era demonstrated a gradual shift for mental illnesses from 
a religious cause to a medical problem.48 Nevertheless, the medieval 
period brought a return of the belief that possessions caused mental 
illness, and in general treatments were more torturous and elaborate than 
in the ancient civilization.49   
2.  Eighteenth & Nineteenth Century U.S.: “Terror acts powerfully upon 
the body, through the medium of the mind, and should be employed in 
the cure of madness.”50 
In the Eighteenth-century, society created hospitals for the treatment of 
mentally ill individuals. 51  For example, Benjamin Franklin, among 
others, petitioned Pennsylvania for a hospital for the “mad” to restore 
their sanity and to protect society.52 However, the conditions of the 
hospital included keeping the 
 
 
The mental illness may represent the will of god by angry or displeased Gods, for example, in the myth 
of Hercules being seized by Lyssa by the goddess Hera. Id. at 5-6.  
 43. Id.; BRACKEL, supra note 8, at 9.  
 44. DEUTSCH, supra note 35, at 9-11 (Other treatments included helebore, massages, baths, diets, 
and exercise.). 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 11.  
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. at 7-12.  
 49. BRACKEL, supra note 8, at 10; DEUTSCH, supra note 35, at 12-23. For example, a tenth century 
treatment for insanity was to “take a skin of mere-swine (sea-pig) or porpoise, work it into a whip, swinge 
the man therewith, soon he will be well.” DEUTSCH, supra note 35 at 12-13. Although this period also 
saw the rise of asylums, sympathy towards the mentally ill, and individuals who spoke out against the 
perceived superstitious connection, the supernatural dominated with beliefs in demonic possessions and 
witches. DEUTSCH, supra note 35 at 12-23.  
 50. ROBERT WHITAKER, MAD IN AMERICA: BAD SCIENCE, BAD MEDICINE, AND THE ENDURING 
MISTREATMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL, 3 (2002) (quoting Benjamin Rush).  
 51. BRACKEL, supra note 8, at 13.  
 52. WHITAKER, supra note 50, at 3-4.  
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lunatics . . . in gloomy, foul-smelling cells and were ruled over by 
‘keepers’ who used their whips freely. Unruly patients, when not 
being beaten, were regularly ‘chained to rings of iron, let into the 
floor or wall of the cell . . . restrained in hand-cuffs or ankle-irons,’ 
and bundled into Madd-shirts that ‘left the patient an impotent 
bundle of wrath.’53 
 
Benjamin Rush reformed the Pennsylvania hospital; he advocated that 
the insane “needed to be treated with kindness and respect.”54 
Nevertheless, Rush was a man of science influenced by English 
treatments such as extreme bloodletting and his rhetoric for the mentally 
ill included calling them “the mad bull and the enraged dog.”55 
Commitment during this time, including to the Pennsylvania hospital, 
generally required only the certification of one physician.56  
3.  The Twentieth Century: “Why do we preserve these useless and 
harmful beings?”57 
During the first half of the twentieth century, eugenics and compulsory 
sterilization influenced treatment of individuals with a mental illness.58 
Eugenics sought to divide the human race into two categories: suitable 
individuals and the mentally ill who were not.59 It was this eugenicist 
mentality that “encouraged Nazi Germany in its massive sterilization of 
the mentally ill, a program that led directly to the crematoriums of the 
Holocaust.”60 Some States prevented mentally ill individuals from 
marrying, and even imposed sanctions—prison time or a fine—on those 
who did marry.61 However, those laws—in the mind of eugenicists—were 
not effective enough at keeping mentally ill individuals from procreating, 
 
 53. Id. at 4.  
 54. Id. at 5.  
 55. Id. at 5, 14-16 (For example, he blood let his patients, and in one patient he removed nearly 
“four-fifths of the blood” in the individual’s body. Other treatments he employed included blisters on the 
ankles, caustics on the back of the neck to allow for “permanent discharge” providing relief to the 
overheated brain, purges, spinning therapy (strapping an individual to a board and spinning them at great 
speeds), etc.).  
 56. BRACKEL, supra note 8, at 14. 
 57. WHITAKER, supra note 50, at 41 (quoting Nobel Prize Winner Dr. Alexis Carrel). 
 58. Id. at 42-62.  
 59. Id. at 44. 
 60. Id. at 42. (Advocates for eugenics included Ivy league educated individuals and academics of 
top schools, “titans of America” such as Rockefeller, feminists, PH.D holders, doctors, psychiatrists, 
biologists, zoologists, geneticists,  psychologists, etc.  In other words, a wide range of individuals 
supported this scientific justification. In 1921, the “American Museum of Natural History hosted the 
Second International Congress on Eugenics.” Even priests and reverends believed in eugenics. It should 
be noted that acceptance was not across the board. Id. at 45-56. 
 61. Id. at 56. 
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so the mentally ill were segregated into asylums and sterilization.62 
Furthermore,  
 
There was no talk, among the eugenicists, of sending the mentally 
ill to hospitals for therapeutic purposes. Instead, they envisioned 
sending the mentally ‘unfit,’ in essence, to detention camps, run on 
barebones budgets, with the ‘patients’ kept there until they had 
passed reproductive age or had been sterilized.63  
 
In addition, although psychiatrists may not have driven the eugenics 
agenda, some embraced sterilization.64 Further, during this time, 
psychiatry performed prefrontal lobotomies and experimented with a 
variety of physical remedies such as removing teeth of the mentally ill.65 
Moreover, doctors touted a procedures success, safety, and necessity; 
some did so even if they had a true understanding of its severe negative 
side-effects.66  
The next half of the twentieth century brought about a “Modern-Day 
Alchemy.”67 Drugs became the way to treat the mentally ill.68 This period 
saw a cycle of miracle drugs followed by discovery of the disastrous side-
effects.69 The medical model approach influenced commitment, and 
States’ laws allowed for easy commitment. 70 For example, in 1970, 31 
states still allowed for certification by one or more physicians to allow for 
commitment.71 
 
 62. Id. at 57. 
 63. Id.  
 64. WHITAKER, supra note 50, at 73. 
 65. Id. at 73-106 (Other treatments included keeping patients asleep for weeks, fever therapy 
(inducing fevers through infecting patients with tuberculosis and other illnesses), hibernation (severely 
reducing temperature of patients, for example in Ohio, by putting mentally ill patients in closets packing 
body with ice and keeping that way for a day or two and then repeating), insulin-coma therapy, etc. These 
therapies were not just back alley and secretive. Findings were presented at conferences, newspapers and 
magazines celebrated successes, etc.). 
 66. Id. at 102-03, 121-127. 
 67. Id. at 141. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 141-144 (For example, in 1954 chlorpromzine as Thorazine was introduced for the 
treatment of schizophrenia. Chlorpromazine was a phenothiazine derivative—used to kill swine parasites 
and as insecticide—and early one the side effects, such as parkinson’s disease symptoms was known.).  
 70. BRACKEL, supra note 8, at 22. 
 71. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR 
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 300 (2ND ED., GUILFORD PRESS). 
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III.  SUPREME COURT REFORMS AND OHIO LAW 
A.  Supreme Court Reform 
In 1971, Justice Blackmun—in regard to civilly committed 
individuals—wrote, “[c]onsidering the number of persons affected, it is 
perhaps remarkable that the substantive constitutional limitations on this 
power have not been more frequently litigated.”72 Early attacks assaulted 
the medical model’s influence on laws, but it was in the 1970s that counter 
trends of the medical model reached their peak, and challenged the 
judicial proceedings deference to medical opinions.73 Although most of 
the procedures and substantive rights that governed involuntary 
commitment were (and are today) statutory, the Supreme Court’s 
decisions began to reform the procedural and substantive rights afforded 
to mentally ill individuals.74  
1.  Length of Detention  
For example in Jackson v. Indiana, the Supreme Court placed limits on 
the length of time a State could civilly detain an individual.75 The Court 
found that the defendant, Jackson, had been deprived of his due process 
and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment when the 
state of Indiana involuntarily committed him on a finding that he was 
incompetent to stand trial that was achieved through a lenient standard 
with the possibility of being an indefinite confinement.76 The Court wrote 
that “[a]t the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of 
commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the 
individual is committed.”77 Individual states determine whether the nature 
and duration of a commitment bears a reasonable relation to the purpose.78 
2.  Standard of Proof 
In addition, the Supreme Court held that civil commitment requires the 
clear and convincing standard of proof.79 In Addington v. Texas, the 
individual argued that his substantive and procedural due process rights 
 
 72. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737 (1972) (internal citations omitted).  
 73. MELTON, supra note 71, at 300-317; BRACKEL, supra note 8, at 21- 22. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Jackson, 406 U.S. 715. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. at 738. 
 78. See e.g. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.38 (West 2017); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 504.110 (West 
2017). 
 79. Addington, 441 U.S. at 433.  
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were violated when he was civilly committed by a standard less than 
beyond a reasonable doubt.80 In determining what standard of proof was 
appropriate the Court balanced the state interest or the societal value on 
the “correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of 
adjudication” and the individual interest or the “value society places on 
individual liberty.”81 The appropriate “standard serves to allocate the risk 
of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance 
attached to the ultimate decision.”82 The Court determined that 
preponderance was too low because the individual and society should not 
share the same risk of error when the individual’s possible harm was 
significantly greater than the possible harm to the state.83 Additionally, 
the Court determined that beyond a reasonable doubt was too high, 
because a false positive—to find a person committable when ultimately 
unnecessary—in the civil setting was not as detrimental as it is in the 
criminal setting.84 Moreover, it determined that the false negative—to 
find a person not committable but really is—was worse in the civil 
commitment setting than in the criminal setting.85 Further, the Court noted 
that in the civil setting it was easier to correct a wrongly committed 
individual because of continued doctor evaluations.86 For example, the 
Court noted that family and friends serve as a protection against falsely 
committing an individual.87 Lastly, the Court reasoned that since 
psychiatric evidence is not an exact science—and necessary in the civil 
commitment setting—so a higher burden of proof would make it almost 
impossible to prove an individual needed to be committed.88 States must 
adhere to the clear and convincing standard of proof, but can decide who 
determines whether the burden has been met.89 In other words, state 
legislatures and courts determine whether a judge, jury, or another decides 
if the evidence supports commitment by clear and convincing evidence.90  
 
 80. Id. at 421-22.  
 81. Id. at 423-425. 
 82. Id. at 423. 
 83. Id. at 425-427. 
 84. Addington, 441 U.S. at 428-29. 
 85. Id. It is based on the presumption that with a false negative in the criminal context individuals 
still have their autonomy, but in civil commitment they do not. If a person lacks autonomy and needs 
commitment, then commitment is beneficial and preferred even on the chance that it is erroneous.  In other 
words, to treat someone restores her autonomy and self-determination. See id.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 429-30.  
 89. Id. See e.g. Ohio Rev. Code § 5122.15 (West 2017); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 330.1458 
(West 2017); Ala. Code § 22-52-9 (West 2017). 
 90. Addington, 441 U.S. at 429-430; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5122.15 (The statute requires that if 
the judge or probate court designates a referee, then it must be a lawyer.). 
10
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3.  Substantive Criteria & State Powers 
In O’Connor v. Donaldson, the Supreme Court held that civil 
commitment could not be based on mental illness “without more.”91 In 
O’Connor, Donaldson was involuntarily committed because he was 
suffering from delusions, and he was detained for fifteen years.92 
Throughout his confinement he did not receive treatment for his illness, 
and repeatedly demanded his release. 93 Additionally, Donaldson had 
family and community groups who were willing to provide care for him 
and requested his release.94 Moreover, Donaldson requested privileges for 
the grounds, occupational training, and the chance to discuss his case, but 
all requests were denied.95 Further, while confined Donaldson was kept 
in large rooms for substantial periods of time with 60 patients, many of 
whom had been criminally committed.96  Donaldson did not pose a danger 
to himself or others during his commitment.97  
Ultimately, the Court held that a non-dangerous individual was neither 
committable solely for being mentally ill, nor if his life could be improved 
by commitment.98 Nonetheless, the Court recognized the legitimacy of 
commitment of individuals through a State’s police power or its parens 
patriae power.99 Under the parens patriae power, the State may commit 
an individual based on the individual’s inability to care for herself.100 
Under the police power, the State can commit mentally ill individuals 
based on their predicted dangerousness to society or self.101 States through 
legislation define the substantive criteria such as what a mental illness is 
and what the appropriate criteria for commitment are.102  
4.  The Seventh Amendment, Due Process, & Equal Protection 
Despite reform, the Supreme Court has yet to determine whether 
 
 91. O'Connor, 422 U.S. 563, 576. 
 92. Id. at 566-67. 
 93. Id. at 568-59, 571. 
 94. Id. at 568-69 (for example, “[i]n 1963, for example, a representative of Helping Hands, Inc., a 
halfway house for mental patients, wrote O'Connor asking him to release Donaldson to its care . . . In 
addition, on four separate occasions between 1964 and 1968, John Lembcke, a college classmate of 
Donaldson's and a longtime family friend, asked O'Connor to release Donaldson to his care.”). 
 95. Id. at 569. 
 96. Id.  
 97. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 568.  
 98. Id. at 575-76.  
 99. Id. at 573-574. 
 100. BRACKEL, supra note 8, at 24. 
 101. Id. at 24-25. 
 102. See e.g. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5122.01 (West 2017); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 202A.026 (West 
2017); Ala. Code § 22-52-10.4 (West 2017). 
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involuntary commitment proceedings require a jury right.103 Since 
involuntary commitment is designated a civil proceeding, the right to jury 
trial in the Constitution is under the Seventh Amendment which states 
“[i]n suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact 
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United 
States, than according to the rules of the common law.”104 Generally, to 
determine if the right was preserved at common law, courts must decide 
if the individual making a similar claim in 1791 had the right to a jury.105 
This analysis also takes into account the importance of jury trials.106 A 
historical analysis of whether the right existed—depending on 
interpretation—may go either way.107 Although it has not directly 
addressed a jury trial in involuntary commitment, the Supreme Court has 
addressed the right in juvenile adjudication; ultimately deciding the right 
to jury neither existed in neither juvenile adjudication nor involuntary 
commitment of juveniles.108 This is pertinent because juvenile 
adjudication and civil commitment are at times analogized because of 
similarities.109 Nevertheless, inherent differences exist in juvenile 
adjudications and the civil commitment of adults.110  
As far as due process rights, the Court is less likely to affirm the right 
to a jury trial.111 Nevertheless, the Court has held that States violate Equal 
 
 103. See Poole v. Goodno, 335 F.3d 705, 711 (8th Cir.2003); C. Peter Erlinder, Essay: Of Rights 
Lost and Rights Found: The Coming Restoration of the Right to A Jury Trial in Minnesota Civil 
Commitment Proceedings, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1269 (2003).  
 104. Const. Amend. VII (emphasis added). 
 105. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (U.S. 1990). 
 106. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).  
 107. Alan M. Dershowitz, Preventive Confinement: A Suggested Framework for Constitutional 
Analysis, 51 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1316 (1973) (indicating at the time of the adoption of the Constitution 
that the right to a jury for determination of involuntary confinement existed in some colonies.). 
 108. Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1970) 
(plurality). In Parham, the Court held that Due Process did not require a jury trial for a juvenile to be 
committed. The Court recognized a child’s liberty interest and potential negative consequences of 
erroneously being labeled as mentally ill, but also wrote that consequences exist for an individual needing 
and not receiving treatment. The Court recognized the parent’s interest in child’s health and welfare. 
Further, it recognized the State interest in commitment and treatment of children and not erecting obstacles 
to prevent individuals who need treatment from receiving such treatment. Ultimately, the Court 
determined that some process by a neutral fact finder was required. However, it noted that the neutral fact 
finder did not have to be a jury or judge and it can be someone such as a social worker. Further, 
commitment must continually be reviewed. Parham, 442 U.S. 584. In McKeiver, the Court undertook a 
balancing approach of the right to have a jury trial in juvenile proceedings against the effect of the right 
on state interests and juvenile commitment proceedings in general. The Court in a plurality decision found 
that a jury trial would not provide for more accurate fact-finding. Additionally, the procedural protection 
would cost the state and may create the juvenile process as adversarial, delays, and not allow 
changes/improvements in the systems to achieve goals of rehabilitation. McKeiver, 403 U.S. 528. 
 109. See Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, supra note 4, at 1284-1285. 
 110. See id.; Addington, 441 U.S. 418.  
 111. Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, supra note 4, at 1295; Dershowitz, supra note at 107, at 
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Protection if they offer a jury trial for civil commitment in one scenario 
but not for others similarly situated.112 In addition, an interesting question 
arises—outside of the scope of this paper—about whether individuals 
with mental illness should be a suspect classification.113 
Although the Supreme Court made reforms, in 1979 civil commitments 
demonstrated an ease to accomplish involuntary commitments with a 
returned deference to medical decisions.114  
B.  Ohio Law 
Currently, the Seventh Amendment is not incorporated to the States.115 
Nonetheless, the Ohio Constitution protects the right to jury trial in civil 
proceedings.116 Further, Ohio applies the federal analysis that the right 
must be preserved at the time Ohio adopted the right to a jury trial in its 
Constitution.117 In 1851, Ohio adopted “[t]he right of trial by jury shall be 
inviolate, except that, in civil cases, laws may be passed to authorize the 
rendering of a verdict by the concurrence of not less than three-fourths of 
the jury.”118 Whether a right existed in Ohio at the time of the adoption of 
 
1316-17 (noting that McKeiver “suggests that the Court will not require a jury trial in other predictive 
proceedings leading to confinement.”). 
 112. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, (1972). But see 
Dershowitz, supra note 107, at 1318-19 (noting that although challenges under equal protection clause 
perhaps provide a successful avenue, the work around would be to not offer a jury trial to either category 
of individuals.).  
 113. For further reading on this topic and arguments that mentally ill individuals should constitute 
a suspect classification and be afforded judicial heightened scrutiny see Mental Illness: A Suspect 
Classification?, 83 YALE L. J. 1237 (1974); Steven K. Hoge, Cleburne and the Pursuit of Equal 
Protection for Individuals With Mental Disorders,” 43 J. A. Academy of Psychiatry L. Online 416-422 
(2015) available at http://jaapl.org/content/43/4/416. Currently, the Supreme Court has held that 
individuals with a mental illness do not constitute heightened scrutiny, but not with unanimity. Board of 
Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, (2001); City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442, (1985) (concluding “for several reasons that the Court of Appeals erred 
in holding mental retardation a quasi-suspect classification calling for a more exacting standard of judicial 
review than is normally accorded economic and social legislation.”); Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312 
(1993) (applying rational basis for a distinction of mental illness and mental retardation in law). C.f. 
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445-78 (J. Marshall concurring in part and dissenting in part noting that it appears 
the majority did apply a distinct standard); Heller, 509 U.S. at 334-35 (J. Blackmun dissenting writing 
“separately only to note [his] continuing adherence to the view that laws that discriminate against 
individuals with mental retardation, or infringe upon fundamental rights, are subject to heightened 
review.”).  
 114. Durham, supra note 2, at 26-28. Additionally, state legislatures changed commitment 
standards from a focus on dangerousness to encompass, for example some states, “need for treatment” or 
“grave disability.” Id. at 27. 
 115. WRIGHT, supra note 13, at § 2301. 
 116. OH. CONST. Art. I, § 5.  
 117. Belding v. State, 169 N.E. 301, 302 (Ohio 1929); Hoops v. United Tel. Co. of Ohio, 553 N.E.2d 
252, 255 (Ohio 1990) (stating “[t]he Ohio Constitution preserves the right to a jury trial only in those civil 
actions where the right existed prior to the adoption” of the section codifying the right.”).  
 118. OH. CONST. Art. I, § 5.  
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the Constitution is an interesting question, but an argument can be made 
that it was a common law right.119 Nevertheless, States may also provide 
for the right to a jury trial through statutes.120  
Some States explicitly deny the right to jury trial in involuntary 
commitment proceedings.121 Other States have recognized the right to a 
jury trial in involuntary commitment procedures.122 Neither Ohio’s 
Constitution nor its statutes explicitly provide or deny the right to a jury 
trial in involuntary commitment proceedings.123  
1.  Substantive Criteria for Involuntary Commitment 
The Ohio Revised Code (“O.R.C.”) sections 5122.01 through 5122.15 
provide the substantive and procedural criteria for involuntarily 
committing an individual with a mental illness.124 Ohio defines mental 
illness as “a substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception, 
orientation, or memory that grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity 
to recognize reality, or ability to meet the ordinary demands of life.”125 
As noted, commitment requires an individual to have a mental illness plus 
something else. The “something else” is based on the States’ police power 
or parens patriae power described above. The former involves the 
individual’s threat of harm to himself or to society.126 The latter involves 
the treatment of the individual because he lacks the capacity to make 
decisions regarding her basic physical needs and the incapacity 
“[r]epresents a substantial and immediate risk of serious physical 
 
 119. BRACKEL, supra note 8, at 11-12; Dershowitz, supra note 107, at 1316 (This argument is 
ultimately for the federal right of Seventh Amendment and the right being rooted in common law at the 
time of the federal constitution); Erlinder, supra note 103, at 1271-1274 (tracing the historical roots of the 
right to a jury in proceedings involving a determination of mental state of the individual); Id. at nt. 3 
(Stating that whether the right is appropriate under the Seventh Amendment is outside the scope of the 
paper, but “the Seventh Amendment “historical test,” which looks to the common law to determine the 
right to a jury, leads to the conclusion that civil commitments required a jury at common law, and would 
therefore, be required under the Seventh Amendment.”) (internal citation omitted); MELTON, supra note 
71, at 299. 
 120. Raine v. Curry, 341 N.E.2d 606, 611 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) (noting that “[w]here a statute 
setting forth a new civil right is adopted, the General Assembly may grant a right to jury trial, but need 
not do so.”). 
 121. See e.g. Ala. Code § 22-52-9; Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 5007 (West 2017). 
 122. See e.g. Alaska Stat. Ann. § 47.30.735 (West 2017); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 27-65-107 (West 
2017) and § 27-65-109; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 27-65-109 (West 2017); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 
330.1458 (West 2017); Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-3-609; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 202A.076 (West 2017). 
 123. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5122.15(C) (The statutes states, “[i]f, upon completion of the hearing, 
the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is a mentally ill person subject to 
court order, the court shall order the respondent for a period not to exceed ninety days to any of the 
following.”).  
 124. Ohio Rev. Code. Ann §§ 5122.01-15 (West 2017).  
 125. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5122.01(A) & (B).  
 126. Id.  
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impairment or injury.”127 Additionally, a person is committable if 
treatment is necessary to prevent “grave and imminent risk to substantial 
rights of others or the person.”128  
2.  Procedures for Commitment: The Ohio Revised Code and In re 
Mental Illness of Thomas 
Involuntary commitment procedures commenced through O.R.C. 
5122.11 require a filing of an affidavit “by any person or persons with the 
probate court, either on reliable information or actual knowledge, 
whichever is determined to be proper by the court.”129 The affidavit must 
sufficiently allege facts to indicate probable cause and allege reasons for 
commitment according to O.R.C. 5122.01(B).130 Under 5122.10, 
emergency commitment may be initiated by psychiatrist, licensed 
psychologists, licensed physician, health officer, parole officer, police 
officer or sheriff.131  
An Ohio Court of Appeals of the Ninth District decision is illustrative 
of the process and results of involuntary commitment procedures in 
Ohio.132 In re Mental Illness of Thomas involved the commitment of 
Linda Thomas to the care of the Alcohol, Drug Addiction and Mental 
Health Services Board of Summit County.133 The process was initiated by 
Thomas’s son, who went to the probate court and filed an affidavit stating 
his mother, “[r]epresents a substantial risk of physical harm to others as 
manifested by evidence of recent homicidal or other violent behavior or 
evidence of recent threats that place another in reasonable fear of violent 
behavior and serious physical harm.”134 His mother, Thomas, was 
detained and admitted to a General Hospital in accordance with O.R.C. 
5122.11.135 She had a hearing in which referee was the trier of fact and 
found by clear and convincing evidence that “Thomas was a mentally ill 
person subject to hospitalization by court order pursuant to R.C. 
5122.15.”136  
 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id.  
 129. Oh. Rev. Code Ann. § 5122.11 (West 2017).  
 130. Id. 
 131. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5122.10 (West 2017). Under O.R.C. 5122.01 a health official “means 
any public health physician; public health nurse; or other person authorized or designated by a city or 
general health district or a board of alcohol, drug addiction, and mental health services to perform the 
duties of a health officer under this chapter.” (emphasis added). Id.  
 132. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5122.15.  
 133. In re Mental Illness of Thomas, 671 N.E.2d 616, 617 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).  
 134. Id.  
 135. Id.  
 136. Id.  
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At Thomas’s hearing two experts testified. The first expert, Dr. 
Parkeeree, had treated Thomas for anxiety about her divorce a year and 
half prior to the hearing, and treated her again upon admission to the 
hospital.137 He diagnosed her with circumscribed, paranoid delusional 
disorder.138 He admitted that Thomas did not suffer from “a substantial 
disorder of memory, mood, orientation or perception,” that Thomas was 
able to care for herself and meet the demands of her life, and that he did 
not notice behavior that illustrated danger to self or others.139 Most of his 
testimony was based on facts provided to him by Thomas’s son and 
husband including the only evidence of violent behavior which was an 
incident six to nine months prior.140 Dr. Pakeeree recommended that 
Thomas be kept in the hospital against her will.141 
The other expert, Dr. Karpawich, first met Thomas in October 1994 
through domestic relations court; he was appointed to evaluate her.142 He 
had three interactions with her throughout that time, and then another 
interaction to evaluate her before the hearing.143 He testified that Thomas 
suffered from “very circumscribed, delusional disorder.”144 Further, that 
her paranoia was limited to her husband; she believed he was following 
her because of the divorce proceedings.145 Dr. Karpawich testified that 
Linda was not afraid of people in general; her paranoia did not extend to 
the doctor or the hospital, but she did have concerns with the other expert 
who had a long relationship with her husband.146 He noted that such a 
concern was legitimate, and not delusional.147 He testified she did not 
have a substantial mood, memory, or orientation disorder; her thought 
disorder was not substantial; and she could meet the ordinary demands of 
life.148 He also testified that he had not witnessed or heard from family 
that she was violent or had any homicidal behavior.149 He did not 
recommend Thomas be involuntarily hospitalized.150 
Linda’s son Andrew also testified, and he admitted that she never 
threatened him or his family, and only knew of threats because his father 
 
 137. In re Mental Illness of Thomas, 671 N.E.2d at 618.  
 138. Id.   
 139. Id.  
 140. Id.  
 141. Id.  
 142. In re Mental Illness of Thomas, 671 N.E.2d at 619. 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id.  
 145. Id.  
 146. Id.  
 147. Id 
 148. Id. 
 149. In re Mental Illness of Thomas, 671 N.E.2d at 619. 
 150. Id. at 620. 
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told him.151 He admitted that although his mom was a recovering 
alcoholic, she had been handling sobriety well.152 Linda’s estranged 
husband Gale also testified. He testified to one incident in their 37-year 
marriage that Thomas threatened him and that the threat had happened six 
months before.153 Gale testified that Thomas called him to tell him to stop 
following her.154  
Finally, Thomas testified. She “stated that her husband had been 
spontaneously stopping by her home two to three times a day, telling her 
she needed to get help because she was sick.”155 These visits agitated her 
to the point that she drove to her husband’s house to tell him to leave her 
alone.156 During the confrontation with her husband, he kept remarking 
that she would not get upset if she got help.157 She then said, “I could kill 
you. I could really kill you.”158 She testified she did not mean her threat 
and that her husband had also threatened her.159 She stated this was the 
only time she had threatened him and after the incident the two went on 
vacation to Las Vegas.160 The trip was a reconciliation attempt.161 In the 
end, she said she would be willing to go to outpatient counseling.162 
At the end of the hearing, the referee determined by clear and 
convincing evidence that Linda was mentally ill and subject to 
hospitalization.163 As the trier of fact, the referee concluded that the 
evidence satisfied the above substantive criteria; Thomas objected to the 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. When questioned about his motives for commitment he admitted the following message he 
left: “Yeah, I'm calling for Linda the Lunatic. You there, mom? You know, I'm just wondering what it's 
like to be you. Why do you have to hang around somebody like Steve and Linda King? You used to have 
friends like Susie Leigh. So why are you going from Susie Leigh to Linda King?“ I'd hate to be you, 
having to look at yourself in the mirror and see what you've done to your retarded daughter and your 
family, your grown children, and your neighbors. How anyone can stand to even look at you or be around 
you is amazing, because you really turned out to be a nothing. “I'm so grateful that Grandma Holton passed 
away where she wouldn't have to see what her daughter has become. It would have broke Grandma's 
heart.” Id.  
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id.  
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. 
 158. Id.  
 159. In re Mental Illness of Thomas, 671 N.E.2d at 621. 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id.  
 162. Id.  
 163. Id. at 617. The Ohio Supreme Court defined clear and convincing evidence as “[t]hat measure 
or degree of proof which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of 
such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will provide in the 
mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” Cincinnati 
Bar Assn. v. Massengale, 568 N.E.2d 1222, 1223 (Ohio 1991). 
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finding, but the probate court adopted the referee’s report.164 On appeal, 
the Court ultimately determined that Linda Thomas was not an individual 
subject to court-ordered hospitalization according to O.R.C. 
5122.01(B).165 Thomas was committed on March 3, 1995; the institution 
moved to terminate commitment on May 1, 1995; and it was not was 
granted until May 16, 1995.166 She had been wrongfully and involuntarily 
committed for 73 days.167  
3.  Case Law 
The Ohio Supreme Court has not determined whether an individual has 
a right to a jury trial in involuntary commitment proceedings. A case from 
the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Fourth District addressed this 
question.168  The defendant in In re Kister appealed pro se and asserted 
the trial court erred in denying him a right to a jury trial.169 The Court of 
Appeals’ entire analysis on this issue is as follows:  
 
In his 8th assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court 
erred by denying his request for a jury trial. We disagree. 
 
An individual does not possess a constitutional or statutory right 
to a jury trial during a probate court proceeding involving an 
involuntary commitment. Cf. State ex rel. Kear v. Court of Common 
Pleas of Lucas Cty., Probate Div. (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 189, 191–
192, 21 O.O.3d 118, 423 N.E.2d 427 (stating that there is no 
constitutional or statutory right to a jury trial in a will contest 
proceeding). Indeed, R.C. 2101.31 specifically states: 
 
All questions of fact shall be determined by the probate judge, 
unless the judge orders those questions of fact to be tried before 
a jury or refers those questions of fact to a special master 
commissioner as provided in sections 2101.06 and 2101.07 of 
the Revised Code. 
 
Moreover, appellant has not pointed to any provision contained 
in the involuntary-commitment statutes that would entitle him to a 
jury trial. 
 
 164. In re Mental Illness of Thomas, 671 N.E.2d at 617. 
 165. Id. at 621-22 
 166. Id. at 617. 
 167. Id.  
 168. In re Kister, 955 N.E.2d 1029 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014). 
 169. Id.  
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Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we hereby 
overrule appellant's 8th assignment of error.170 
 
The opinion has two flaws. First, it analogizes the rights afforded in 
will contestation proceedings to those afforded in involuntary 
commitment proceedings because they both occur in probate court. The 
court reasoned that since will contestation does not require a jury trial, 
involuntary commitment proceedings do not either. The opinion cited the 
Ohio Supreme Court decision in State ex rel. Kear v. Court of Common 
Pleas of Lucas Cty. for this proposition. However, the Kister Court 
mischaracterizes the Kear case. In Kear, the Court explicitly held that “[a] 
party to a will contest action does not have the right to a jury trial; instead, 
a probate court has discretion to determine whether to sit as the trier of 
fact in a will contest action or to impanel a jury. (R.C. 2107.71 through 
2107.76 and R.C. 2101.31 construed and applied.)”171 The Ohio Supreme 
Court’s sole issue was to determine if a party contesting a will has the 
right to a jury trial—as opposed to probate courts in general.172 The Ohio 
Supreme Court determined this question by doing a historical analysis; 
whether the right to will contestation was a right prior to adoption of 
Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution or not.173 Although in Kear the Court 
noted that probate courts are decedents of ecclesial courts which did not 
offer the right to a jury trial, the Ohio Supreme Court based its decision 
on the historical analysis.174 
Second, unlike the Kear decision, the Kister Court did not engage in 
any type of historical analysis of whether an individual has a right to a 
jury trial in involuntary commitment proceedings.175 Nor does the opinion 
for the issue address any type of equal protection or due process rights.176 
In fact the opinion denies the right to a jury trial constitutionally without 
even citing the Ohio Constitution.177 
IV.  CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT  
Involuntary commitment involves a multitude of negative 
consequences for individuals. This section illustrates why the Kear 
 
 170. Id. at 1050-51. 
 171. State ex rel. Kear v. Ct. Com. Pl. of Lucas Cty., Prob. Div., 423 N.E.2d 427, 427–28 (Ohio 
1981) (syllabus).  
 172. Id. at 428.  
 173. Id. at 429 
 174. Id.  
 175. In re Kister, 955 N.E.2d at 1029.   
 176. Id.  
 177. Id.   
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court’s analogy of wills and civil commitment is illogical, supports the 
gravity of what commitment entails, and demonstrates the need for extra 
protections for involuntary commitment proceedings, such as a jury 
option.  
A.  Deprivation of Liberty  
Both the United States Supreme Court and the Ohio Supreme Court 
have recognized that involuntary commitment is a significant deprivation 
of liberty.178 This deprivation extends beyond continual detainment, for 
example, safety concerns and disciplinary reasoning restrict a 
committee’s movements within an institution.179  
In addition, commitment is likely to be based on predictive basis using 
psychiatric diagnosis to predict the individual’s future harmful conduct.180  
Dueling psychiatrists illustrate one problem with predictive confinement, 
in other words, it is not an exact science and avails itself to differing 
opinions.181 In addition, the unreliability of professionals to predict future 
violent acts, and further “to overpredict violence, and indeed are more 
often wrong than right” is a problem.182 Further, since confinement may 
result without the individual committing an offense or committing a 
minor offense, the standard of proof—clear and convincing evidence—is 
lower than for a criminal trial, but may result in longer confinement.183 
Moreover, since the proceeding is characterized as civil and not criminal, 
the individual is offered less procedural safeguards.184 
B.  Serious Collateral Consequences & Forcible Medication 
Negative societal stereotypes of individuals with mental illness have 
 
 178. Addington, 441 U.S. 418; State v. Williams, 930 N.E.2d 770, 781 (Ohio 2010). 
 179. Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, supra note 4, at 1193–94. 
 180. Dershowitz, supra note 107, at 1286-87. The article further notes that “a large number of 
mentally ill persons currently confined in mental hospitals on purely preventive grounds.” Id. at 187-88. 
 181. Id. at 1290. Dueling psychiatrists refers to cases such as In re Thomas described above. 
 182. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 437–38, (California 1976) (citing 
the American Psychiatric Association amicus brief as well as other articles); American Psychiatric 
Association, Amicus Briefs: Barefoot v. Estelle, 3-4 (1982),  available at 
https://www.psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/search-directories-databases/library-and-archive/amicus-briefs 
(arguing “[t]he Use of Psychiatric Testimony in a Capital Case on the Issue of a Defendant's Long-Term 
Future Dangerousness is Constitutionally Invalid Because it Undermines the Reliability of the Factfinding 
Process” and stating that “[t]he large body of research in this area indicates that, even under the best of 
conditions, psychiatric predictions of long-term future dangerousness are wrong in at least two out of 
every three cases.”); see also Addington, 441 U.S. at 418 (noting that “[t]he reasonable-doubt standard is 
inappropriate in civil commitment proceedings because, given the uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis.). 
 183. Dershowitz, supra note 107, at 1291-94. 
 184. Id. at 1296-1307. 
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increased since the 1950s.185 Stereotypes include the fear that such 
individuals are violent and should be excluded from society.186 
Additionally, stereotypes engender authoritarianism attitudes, such as the 
notion that severe mental illness makes people irresponsible, and 
therefore their decisions should be made by others. Alternatively, 
stereotypes promote a type of benevolent attitude that individuals with a 
mental illness are like children and need to be provided care.187  
1.  Stigma, Adverse Social Consequences, & Discrimination 
Stereotypes can create prejudices, stigmas, and other adverse social 
consequences for individuals with mental illness such as 
discrimination.188 An individual may suffer from both societally and 
individually created stigmas; both are significant and harmful.189 For 
example, the “fear-based exclusion” and a fear of individuals with a 
mental illness (and fear of viewing the undesirable symptoms of mental 
illness) induces in people a “strong desire for social distance,” and can 
influence an individual’s decision not to seek help. 190 In addition, having 
a mental illness can cause other adverse social consequences and 
discrimination.191 Discriminatory behavior towards mentally ill 
individuals includes “withholding help, avoidance, coercive treatment, 
and segregated institutions.” 192 Further, it influences mentally ill 
individuals’ ability to lease safe housing or obtain a good job.193  
2.  Forcible Medication 
It is well settled that forcible medication significantly infringes on an 
individual’s liberty interest in bodily integrity, autonomy, and personal 
security.194 Further, individuals have a constitutional right to refuse 
medicine based on individual autonomy.195 Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court has upheld the right to forcibly medicate individuals, with 
 
 185. Link, supra note 34, at 1328. 
 186. Id. at 1332-33; Patrick W. Corrigan & Amy Watson, Understanding the impact of stigma on 
people with mental illness, 1 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 16, 17 (2002). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Corrigan, supra note 186, at 16; Addington, 441 U.S. at 425-426. 
 189. Id.  
 190. Link, supra note 34, at 1332-3.  
 191. Corrigan, supra note 186; Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, supra note 4, at 1200-01.  
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990); Steele v. Hamilton Cty. Community Mental Health Bd., 
736 N.E.2d 10, 16 (Ohio 2007).  
 195. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
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qualifications, who are committed.196 For example, an individual who is 
found dangerous to self or others may be forcibly medicated.197 Further, 
a compelling governmental interest may overcome the mentally ill 
individual’s refusal of medication.198 Moreover, the police power as well 
as parens patriae justifications can overcome the refusal of treatment and 
allow for forcible medication.199 
The fact that antipsychotic drugs have serious side effects amplifies the 
liberty interest against forcible medication.200 The Ohio Supreme Court 
recognized the negative side effects of antipsychotic drugs including 
Parkinsonian syndrome, akathisia, dystonia, and dyskinesia.201 Some side 
effects are reversible by stopping the use of the drugs, but other side 
effects, such as tardive dyskinesia, have no known treatment to manage 
symptoms.202 Finally, a side effect called neuroleptic malignant syndrome 
can cause death.203 
V.  OHIO SHOULD RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL IN 
INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS 
It is unlikely that the Supreme Court will secure the right to a jury trial 
under the equal protection or the due process. Further, the unanswered 
question under the Seventh Amendment would not extend to the states 
automatically. Therefore, Ohio should follow other states and statutorily 
recognize the right to a jury trial in involuntary commitment proceedings. 
This recognition would provide protection for the individual, and a better 
societal understanding of individuals with a mental illness.  
 
 196. Harper, 494 U.S. 210; Debra A. Breneman, Forcible Antipsychotic Medication and the 
Unfortunate Side Effects of Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 123 S.ct. 2174 (2003), 27 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 965, 966 (2004). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id.  
 199. Steele, 736 N.E.2d 10, 18-20. 
 200. Id. at 16; Harper, 494 U.S. at 210. 
 201. Steele, 736 N.E.2d at 17. The diseases side effects include, “Parkinsonian syndrome consists 
of muscular rigidity, fine resting tremors, a masklike face, salivation, motor retardation, a shuffling gait, 
and pill-rolling hand movements. Akathisia is a feeling of motor restlessness or of a compelling need to 
be in constant motion. Dystonia involves bizarre muscular spasm, primarily of the muscles of the head 
and neck, often accompanied by facial grimacing, involuntary spasm of the tongue and mouth interfering 
with speech and swallowing, oculogyric crisis marked by eyes flipping to the top of the head in a painful 
upward gaze persisting for minutes or hours, convulsive movements of the arms and head, bizarre gaits, 
and difficulty walking. The dyskinesia present a broad range of bizarre tongue, face, and neck 
movements.” Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id.  
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A.  Individual’s Interest 
As the previous sections illustrate, commitment of mentally ill 
individuals is not always conducive to the rhetoric that assures it is what 
is best for them. Additionally, as the history illustrates experts are not 
always the best indicators of commitment. Also, the unreliability of 
predictive judgments exacerbates the situation. Moreover, as Section IV 
indicates involuntary commitment involves a whole host of negative 
consequences. Likewise, as noted above, stereotypes and discrimination 
towards individuals with a mental illness illicit several reactions: fear and 
exclusion, authoritarianism, or benevolence.  
A jury trial may rectify these issues for the following reasons. It may 
cause the civil commitment proceedings to take a more serious form and 
ensure that an individual is given a fair proceeding and proper 
consideration.204 The jury may influence the proceedings to be more 
formalized and enforce procedural safeguards.205 Second, as noted above, 
a jury will safeguard the civil liberties of individuals, evaluate evidence, 
apply standards, and overall give the case the fact-based treatment it 
deserves.206 Further, it will consider the case without relying on 
stereotypical ideological beliefs that individual need someone to care for 
them or be excluded from society. 207 Thus, people like Linda Thomas—
when the evidence did not support a clear and convincing standard—may 
not be automatically committed. Fourth, if a jury trial exists individuals 
may receive an individualized decision.208 For example, commitment will 
be based on the proceedings and evidence presented at the proceeding, 
and not any interactions prior to the proceeding.209 Finally, a jury trial will 
present another opportunity for appeal of commitment statutes.210 
Additionally, the nature of civil commitment based on predictive 
 
 204. Section II, A.  
 205. Id.   
 206. Id.  
 207. Id. Of course, the counterargument then goes how does a jury ensure that the individuals on 
the jury will not do the same. But see Kavanaugh, supra note, 15 (The article illustrates that the jury for 
sexually dangerous commitments in Massachusetts were providing fair and just decisions, evaluating the 
evidence, enforcing the standards of commitment, and overall doing exactly the opposite of what the 
legislatures thought they would do. In other words, the juries were letting individuals go at a higher rate 
than judges, but the legislators thought they would commit more individuals.). 
 208. See Section II, A. Additionally a trial jury “imposes a barrier to “judicial whispering,” a 
phenomenon that plagues predictive proceedings. Prosecutors often manage to convey to the judge—
informally and off the record—the “real” basis for the confinement, which may often differ from the 
formal one. But no one can whisper to the jury. The jury must be openly and formally charged and may 
hear only evidence that is a matter of record.” Dershowitz, supra note 107, at 1318. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Dershowitz, supra note 107, at 1318 (For example, the judge must give the instruction to the 
jury on the meaning of the statute’s criteria and such instructions can be appealed. However, with no jury 
the judge does not have to openly remark on specifics.).  
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judgments and not factual disputes about what happened—in contrast to 
some rhetoric—indicate a greater need for protections.211 In other words, 
when an individual is facing commitment based on what she might do, 
“why should this critical fact not be established in the same manner as 
other critical facts, and why should the law deputize the psychiatrist, 
rather than the jury, to perform this fact-finding function?”212 Thus, 
involuntary commitment should be afforded at least similar protections as 
criminal proceedings, such as the right to jury.213 
B.  Societal Interest 
As noted above, another reason for a jury trial is that it embodies 
democratic ideals, it encourages the participation of society, and it 
introduces community values into the decision-making process. 
Currently, “the public is largely unaware of civil commitment policies 
and practice—its extent, function and current context.”214 Since possible 
solutions to correcting the stigmas and discrimination include education, 
participation in the commitment proceedings may alleviate some of the 
myths surrounding individuals with mental illness.215 Overall, the 
exposure to individuals with mental illness through jury participation can 
increase a better understanding of what it means to have a mental 
illness.216 Moreover, a better understanding would influence better and 
reflective treatments of individuals with a mental illness.217  
In addition, since predictive confinement is a social policy judgment, a 
jury made up of the community is arguable the best to make such a 
decision and not an expert.218 Moreover, a jury would increase perceived 
legitimacy of the proceedings.219 
 
 211. Id. at 1306. 
 212. Id. at 1311. 
 213. Id. at 1318. 
 214. Durham, supra note 2, at 18. 
 215. Corrigan, supra note 186 (The article notes that “[s]everal studies have shown that 
participation in education programs on mental illness led to improved attitudes about persons with these 
problems Education programs are effective for a wide variety of participants, including college 
undergraduates, graduate students, adolescents, community residents, and persons with mental illness.”) 
(internal citations omitted); David L. Penn & Shannon M. Couture, Strategies for reducing stigma toward 
Persons with Mental Illness, 1 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 20, (2002).  
 216. Id. 
 217. BRACKEL, supra note 8, at 16. Additionally, “the history of social psychiatry teaches us that 
cultural conceptions of mental illness have dramatic consequences for  
 218. Dershowitz, supra note 107, at 1317 (Noting that “[i]f these decisions about risks and freedom 
are to be abdicated, in a democratic society it is better that it be abdicated to a jury than to a psychiatrist 
or a judge.”). 
 219. Ainsworth, supra note 15, at 1126. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Involuntary commitment needs to move away from a “for their best 
interest” mentality or fear of the undesirables. As the history illustrates, 
the presumption of involuntary commitment as what is best for the 
individual does not always conform and should be eliminated, and 
individuals should be afforded protections that represent the gravity of his 
or her commitment. Although it may be true that an individual with a 
serious problem needs help, involuntary commitment should not just seek 
to isolate individuals, deemed undesirable, from society.220 As noted 
above, these individuals are facing serious consequences, and it is 
imperative that such consequences reflect the appropriate protections. As 
long as involuntary commitment remains a legal question, the protections 
should be legal in nature. To be clear, this article is not advocating that 
people who need treatment should not receive such treatment. But by 
making a fairer proceeding for commitment, as a society, we can 
concentrate on the individual patients’ needs and formulate treatment 
accordingly. Further, it may help alleviate and remove stigma, 
stereotypes, and discrimination surrounding mental illness. Therefore, 
individuals may seek out treatment voluntarily for themselves and others. 
 
 220. Durham, supra note 2, at 19 (The articles states two things pertinent here, the first a question: 
“If seriously mentally ill people come from all segments of society, why are only poor and disadvantaged 
people committed to state mental hospitals?” The other is a statement that “[t]he vast majority of 
involuntary committees are hospitalized because of annoying or bizarre behavior rather than for 
threatening or violent acts.”).  
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